The 2/22nd Infantry Battalion was raised on 1 July 1940 and was part of the 23rd Brigade of the 8th Division. It consisted of approximately 1000 volunteers with most of the men allotted to one of the rifle companies. Others reported to Headquarters Company (HQ), the Mortar Platoon, Pioneer Platoon, Anti-Aircraft Light Machine Gun Platoon, Reinforcement Company, or Bren Gun Carrier Platoon.
Lieutenant A.R. Tolmer joined the battalion on 7 July from the 46th Militia Battalion (Brighton Rifles) and led the Pioneer Platoon.
The battalion was initially headquartered at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne but on 11 July moved to Trawool in central Victoria for training. On 24 September the 2/22nd was ordered to move to Bonegilla, near Wodonga. The battalion made the 235 km bivouac on foot and arrived on 4 October. Training soon resumed.
By the start of 1941, Japan was capturing and fortifying islands just over the equator and the Advisory War Council told Australians that the war had moved to a new stage of ‘utmost gravity’ and needed ‘the greatest effort of preparedness that this country has ever made’. It decided to send three Battalions to the islands north namely the 2/20th (Sparrow Force) to Ambon the 2/21 (Gull Force) to Timor and the 2/22 (Lark Force) to Rabaul.
Around ANZAC day 1941, a battalion of 1,000 men from the 2/22 Battalion began arriving in Simpson Harbour, Rabaul. It combined with the local unit of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NVGR), a coastal defence battery, an anti-aircraft battery, elements of the 2/10th Field Ambulance and 17th Anti-tank Battery to form Lark Force. The force would later be supported by 24 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Its role was to protect the airfields at Lakunai and Vunakanau, and the seaplane base at Rabaul, as well as provide early warning of Japanese movements through the islands to Australia’s north. Like the other “bird forces” deployed to Australia’s north, Lark Force was ill-equipped and likely to be overwhelmed by enemy attack. Nonetheless, the 2/22nd spent the next eight months constructing defences and training for operation in a tropical environment.
By the end of the year the garrison had grown to 1,400 men and women.
The 2/22 called itself Little Hell (‘little hell’ being slang for a hand of three two-pip cards in poker) the battalion and the town soon adapted to each other and Little Hell’s brass band of Salvation Army recruits put on concerts. For a while it was almost fun.
The battalion was badly equipped and under-trialed for the war that was coming, but morale was high. New Guinea was Australian territory, after all, even though the terms of the League of Nations mandate stated that ‘no military or naval bases shall be established, nor fortifications erected in the territory’.
In fact, there were secret plans to turn Rabaul into an American base. The US and British were already having a conversation about what to do should Japan attack the US, and that included turning Rabaul into a base for American ships and planes.In the secret dispatches between Washington and Melbourne, Rabaul was code- named ‘Base F’.
What made everyone nervous about base F were its volcanoes. After the big earthquake in 1941 there was unlikely to be a major eruption in the short term at least
The Chief of Naval Staff sent a polite cable to Washington regarding US assistance: ‘
“The Commonwealth Government would be pleased to receive a United States mission to make all the necessary arrangements for the defence of Rabaul and would suggest that such a mission should include the technical officers necessary to make detailed plans”.
The plans included upgrading a little used airport outside the caldera to take B-17 bombers.
The US Navy began loading a ship bound for Rabaul under a Lend Lease arrangement. The cargo included anti-submarine nets, a minefield, sonar and a team of US ‘technical advisers’, as well as six 7.5 inch guns for coast defence, eight 3.5 inch anti-aircraft guns, twelve 0.5 inch machine guns and ammunition. But it was all too late. On 7 December 1941, only days after the loading began, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and the Americans retained the cargo. Thus the reinforcement of Rabaul disappeared.
With the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the start of the war in the Pacific the Australian War Cabinet decided three things – firstly, that there would be no additional strengthening of the Rabaul garrison, secondly, not to place at risk any large ships in order to assist the garrison and thirdly, Lark Force should hold out as long as possible. A secret cable was sent to Washington which in part stated “it is considered better to maintain only as an advance air operational base, the present small garrison being regarded as hostages to fortune.” Hostages, no less! Weeks before the first shot was fired Canberra essentially washed its hands of Lark Force.
“As a result, no contingency plans were made to rescue any soldiers who might survive the pending invasion. Lark Force was trapped on New Britain. [1]
Japanese bombing of New Britain began in early January 1942, increasing in intensity as the month continued. By the morning of 22 January 24 Squadron was virtually destroyed by Japanese carrier based fighters and its three remaining aircraft were withdrawn. With no use for the airstrips, both were destroyed and Lark Force withdrew from Rabaul, waiting on the western shores of Blanche Bay for the inevitable Japanese landings.
These began at 1am on 23 January. By 9am, communication failures and the overwhelming Japanese strength – 5,000 troops compared to the 1,400 of Lark Force – destroyed the cohesion of the Australian defence. The Lark Force commander, Colonel John Scanlan, ordered a withdrawal on the morning of 23 January on the basis of “every man for himself”. Unprepared for retreat, chaos ensued and Lark Force disintegrated.
In ensuing days, 2/22nd parties, ranging from company-strength down to pairs and individuals, sought escape along New Britain’s north and south coasts. Some found small boats and got away under their own auspices; others were picked up by larger vessels operating from New Guinea.
New Britain geographically was shaped like a curved sausage with the top tip, the Gazelle Peninsular, angled north east and the bottom tip facing west. The top coast faced north and the bottom coast faced south (refer map in Appendix A). The two avenues of escape from Rabaul were along the north coast (Rabaul faced east) and either south west (to get to the south side of Gazelle Peninsular to spots along the peninsular) or to Wide Bay and further along the south coast. Alex, by circumstance, was involved in the northern attempt.
Bill Harry’s role prior to the invasion was to survey the surrounding area. He became friendly with some of the Methodist missionaries and went on many patrols with them into the mountains, gaining a greater understanding of the jungle, its tracks and villages. Bill’s knowledge of the land was invaluable and he was summoned by Colonel Scanlan to work with him and Command HQ to assist in very belatedly planning a retreat into the jungle. When Scanlan and some other officers decided to surrender, Bill headed for the south coast.
Continued landings by the Japanese on both the north and south coasts parallel to and behind Rabaul cut off the limited roads and they patrolled the beaches. The only way to escape was through the jungle and those that did travelled through the pouring rain on the first night and were generally captured. Alex was in a group with Capt. Pip Appel, who safely led most of A and C Companies (some 300 men) across the Keravat River, aiming to wind up in the vicinity of the Vunalama Coffee Plantation run by half caste family headed by a man named Saunders who could possibly help out with a pinnacle (small motor boat) and food.
Capt. Appel as senior officer had at this point taken charge of all troops in his area. The next day Appel had everyone paraded and informed the men they were no longer to adopt the attitude of ‘every man for himself’ but would act under his command. They were broken up into small groups and would go further along the northwest coast to seek any form of sea transport. Alex was with Lieut. Jeff Donaldson and an unknown number of others headed for the hills. A good friend of Alex, Lieut. Gordon Brayden, led a party of 11 from the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles along a coast route. Alex warned Gordon not to take a route around the northern coast and the Japanese captured Gordon and 40 others at Gavit and over 100 at Lassul Bay (refer Appendix B Gazelle Peninsular map).
From invasion day A Company had broken up and a member describes how it was[2]. “Contact was completely lost with the remainder of A Company and the night was spent in the open in heavy rain”.
“From this time on life was to become quite unreal, already the last organised meal had been taken 24 hours earlier, established communication had been lost and remnants of the company scattered, without the means to continue resistance in any form.
Earlier orders had now been expanded into the Army principle, which confirmed our intentions, not to be taken prisoner with all its implications, but to escape if at all possible.
With these thoughts clearly in mind and being denied the route to the south coast, the mouth of the Keravat River (on the north east coast) became the prime objective.
These thoughts were almost hallucinations when compared to the actualities which made nearly every succeeding day, for the next two and a half months, days of indescribable endurance and hardship.”
Seventy two hours had now passed as the group worked its way through jungle, obliged to keep off any worthwhile track or road, as enemy patrols came along to shoot un-discriminately at anything that moved. “Clothing was everlastingly wet, boots filled with water, the leather like pulp, worldly goods reduced to what we stood up in.
Day followed day in the movement to the experimental farm, where we expected to cross the Keravat River (west of Rabaul). On the third day contact was made with another few lads.
The enemy was active and in strength and a crossing had to be found elsewhere. Another day, food literally non-existent, everyone tired and disappointed as they face up to retracing steps to find a suitable crossing. With every step it seemed tree roots reached up to snare tired feet and to bring the owner down, or vines to catch in clothing or hair, hindering attempts to walk with ease”.
“Three days passed, the tracks misleading, just hacking away through the undergrowth, unable to see the sun, any sense of orientation lost; the party completed a full circle that day”.
“Fully realising we just had to get down to the coast (west of Rabaul) a creek was found which we followed. At last after eight days the welcome sound of surf on the beach was heard, the last four days had been near starvation but hopefully out in the sunshine there were prospects of native habitation and so food. As the beaches were patrolled by the enemy during the day, we continued through the night and came to the Vudal River.
Here in our ignorance, we got caught up in a swamp, the further we progressed the denser it became, deeper and more difficult, but the time came when it was felt we just couldn’t go back. It was exhausting, struggling over the unseen, water covered roots, falling over, wet to the skin in the stinking mud, when late in the afternoon came upon a small bank which eventually led out to dry land” and made it to the Mandres River which was in flood. We waited two days then formed a human chain to wade across the river and continue on to Vunalama. At Vunalama, Saunders was kind enough to give us a small amount of food and sold us two ducks.
Incidentally, it was here at Vunalama that we heard the story of how Lieuts. J.G. Donaldson and A.R. Tolmer had sent Saunders to the Japanese Commander with a request for a bag of rice to give them enough strength to come in and surrender, and the hilarious reaction when they received the rice”.
Saunders arranged a couple of guides to show a short track to Massawa and thence to the mission at St Pauls where somehow Major John Ackeroyd the Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) had managed to get his wounded and ill to this refuge and had set up a small hospital (doubtless Tolmer and Donaldson assisted in doing this feat).
After a very difficult river crossing the party proceeded past Asilingi to Tovanakuss then went onto Gavit, where Marshall had met up with Gordon Braden. These two had organised a number of men into beach patrols, establishing a garden and setting up a Regimental Aid Post (RAP).
“The next day we went on down the coast to old Massin plantation house on the beach at the junction of the Usavit River, where we rested the following four days. But the mosquitoes were terrible.
On the Sunday night in the wee hours, a dull thump thump was heard and in the half-light a fairly large Japanese ship was seen moving around the point into Massawa Bay: it was such a helpless feeling not being able to warn the Braden troops at Gavit”.
Keith McCarthy, the local District Officer for the Australian government, whose headquarters were at Talasea, was in charge of the escape plan approved by Port Moresby for the men on the north coast. The plan was to commence from Pondo planation (refer map in Appendix B) on the north coast which the Japanese had raided but would not come back to as they were trying to trap Australians further north on the Gazelle Peninsular. He knew the country and was able to formulate an effective escape plan using local shipping, planned depots and a link to bigger ships from New Guinea.
Pondo was a large plantation normally employing 800 people and whilst the Japanese landed there and whilst they sunk the main supply boat the damage they did to Malahuka, the company schooner, on the slipway and buildings was repairable. With good supply of food the plantation was still a going concern.
His plan was simple – firstly get to Pondo by any way. From there he expected to provide food and possibly water transport to at least get past inaccessible areas to get everyone to the western end of the island.
On the south coast Bill Harry was sometimes by himself and sometimes assisting small groups. His survival skills as a ‘boy from the bush served him well. They had passed through Kalail and were at Milim some 15 miles away when a runner came with a note from a warrant officer Arthur Sinclair. The note read “Advise return immediately. New plan”. The group conferred briefly and decided the message was too cryptic to act upon in blind faith. The trip would take two days to get there, and if the new plan was not workable, two days to get back. Bill Harry set out by himself walking through the jungle day and night and returned on the second day to confirm that they needed to get to Pondo on the north coast.
Cpl. Headlam rode a horse around advising groups to go to Pondo. “He reached Appel in the early hours of 22 February at Hervey’s plantation (where he was based) and Appel learned that McCarthy was in the vicinity. The timing could have not been better. Appel had received additional messages from the Japanese that they would round up all Australian troops at Lassul Bay on 22 February. He was on the verge of giving up, but the news of McCarthy’s arrival saved the day. Appel met with McCarthy in the morning and together they planned an evacuation”.
“The plan’s success depended entirely on Appel. Because the Japanese controlled the waters off Lassul Bay, he had to move his men overland to Pondo, 25 miles from Hervey’s plantation, in order for McCarthy to evacuate them by boat” [3].
“Appel at once distributed messages to all areas where men might be found and at dawn set out to meet McCarthy. Appel told McCarthy that he would have 145 men in Pondo in seven days. Despite the excitement of the prospects, Appel checked out ‘credentials and investigated possibilities’ then sent by the hand of Sgt. R.K. Walls the following message to Tolmer, Donaldson and Ackeroyd”.
To Alec. Tolmer, Jeff Donaldson and Acker, of course, if in area.
The bearer will give you the news. I think this is a break for us, but it looks like a hard job.
Natives must not be asked to do porterage on the route, and it is imperative that no missionaries or half-castes hear anything. Weigh both sides and then make your decision. Good luck to all of you
E.D, Appel. Capt.
“Appel pulled his men back up into the hills. His most difficult task was leaving behind those who were too sick to travel. At this John Ackeroyd stepped forward and volunteered to remain with eight men at St Paul’s Mission, knowing that all of them would eventually become POW’s. Later, Ackeroyd was decorated with a Member of the British Empire for his selfless devotion.
Appel wanted to get to Pondo before the main body arrived and tracked over the mountains to Seragi plantation, on the west coast hours before the Vunalama pinnace was due to leave with Tolmer and Donaldson.
“For them on the next stage a dingy was towed by a pinnace with a small Chapman pump engine. At a critical time a north west squall broke right behind them, the seas came up to an alarming and dangerous degree, to the extent that the native engineer headed for the shore rather than the boat sink under them”.
At Pondo Alex worked tirelessly to get the Malahuka into a seaworthy condition because when the Japanese had landed at Pondo they had punched a large hole in the hull and disabled the engine. They loaded 45 men with stores on the ship’s first run at 2200 hours on 2 March but there were several breakdowns and the fly wheel would not stay on so all paddled for shore with planks.
Alex trotted seven miles back to Pondo in bare feet for spares and to have parts repaired. Norm Furness (the secretary of the Lark Force Association) commented that Alex’s efforts in repairing the Malahuka were critical in ensuring that troops could escape from Pondo. The ship hit a reef and blew up so the troops were left with 80 miles to walk to the further rendezvous point. The troops were deteriorating in health and strength so the journey was slow going.
Those that had not been transported on the Malahuka walked and canoed through 13 base camps, each within a day’s march, to cover the 267 miles (427km) to get to Sag Sag Mission near Iboki
Alex and 250 others sailed to Cairns on board the ship Lakatoi in overcrowded conditions and arrived on March 8 1942 in a very poor state with little in the way of clothing and most had tropical ulcers. The other escape ship for the south coast was the Administrator’s yacht Laurabada.
One of the most notable characters in the escape was Nelson Tokidoro, a 15 year old Melanesian boy from Rabaul, a tele-radio operator recruited by Keith McCarthy. He was a very capable hand not just a radio operator.
Around 400 members of Lark Force managed to return to Australia, 300 of which were members of the 2/22nd.
Approximately 160 Australians captured by the Japanese while trying to escape were massacred at Tol Plantation and another 836 were interned as prisoners of war. On 22 June 1942 a group of Australian prisoners and European civilians were loaded aboard the Montevideo Maru to be transported to Hainan Island. The ship was sunk on 1 July by the submarine USS Sturgeon off the Philippines, killing all 1,053 prisoners and civilian internees trapped below decks. The Australian officers and a small number of civilians who were left behind at Rabaul were subsequently shipped to Japan on the Natuno Maru, where they remained until liberated in September 1945.
The 2/22nd was never re-raised.
Battle Honours – Rabaul 1942
Between March and June 1942 Alex was suffering his first bout of malaria. His war Record states that he was disembarked Brisbane 27 March and transferred on 10 April to the 115 Aust. General Hospital (115 AGH)[4]. He re-joined ‘the unit’[5] in Foster on 21 May only to be hit with malaria again on 4 June and transferred back to the 115 AGH re-joining his unit on 22 June.
On 11 July he joins the 39th Battalion in Sydney and embarks on 14 July for New Guinea and on 31 July transfers to the 49th Battalion for the next harrowing episode.
Further articles:
FOOTNOTES:
[1] DARKEST HOUR – The true story of Lark Force at Rabaul, Australia’s Worst Military Disaster of World War II, by Bruce Gamble, Chapter 3 – Hostages to Fortune, pages 56 and 57.
[2] Rabaul 1942 by Douglas Alpin, Chapter 14 Lakatoi, pages 128-135. published by 2/22nd Battalion A.I.F. Lark Force Association.
[3] Gamble pages 173 and 175
[4] This Hospital was known as the Fairfield Infectious Diseases Hospital in Heidelberg, Melbourne
[5] The war Record states, ‘re-joined unit’ and lists 2/22nd Battalion but this is probably not the case and the Record, which was primarily for pay purposes, simply has him in an active unit in Aust.