Conclusion

I have often thought about whether the Bougainville conflict could have been resolved more quickly with less loss of life. Media reporting claims at least 20,000 local people died, many being women in labour, between 1989 and 2001 when a ceasefire was established. I am not sure how many PNG security force personnel were killed but I would estimate between 100 to 200. To this day I remain unsure what could or should have occurred. However, I offer the following with 20/20 hindsight.

• The PNGDF and RPNGC
  • Underestimated the BRA capabilities and innovativeness. As with the Ukrainians today, the BRA were fighting in their homeland and were much better connected to the local population than the security forces
  • Did not understand how to operate effectively in the thick jungle as they were too slow, too heavily burdened and could not react with speed to the hit and run tactics of the BRA.
  • The security forces failed to win the “hearts and minds” of the locals and made virtually no attempt to understand the relationship the landowners had with their land and the matrilineal ownership that meant that the women owned the land and had to be negotiated with.
  • The PNGDF failed to use their helicopters effectively. By deploying sub-units quickly from place to place and forcing the BRA to operate further from their secure bases in the mountains may have been a better tactic rather than using them primarily in a ground attack role.
  • Poor leadership at various levels allowed some security force members to commit human rights abuses which were widely broadcast in national and international media. These abuses were common knowledge on the ground. I have no doubt they gave decision makers in Canberra much to ponder. To this day, I am not aware of any persons being brought before a court of law to account for their actions.
  • Within the security forces, especially in the early days, there was a lack of loyalty especially between senior officers – Col. Nuia v Brigadier Lokinap was a perfect example of one undermining the other. Lokinap, although the Commander of PNGDF, was often derided by Nuia, with his usual comment in front of subordinates, “If he wants it done that way, he can leave Murray Barracks and come here and do it himself.”
• BRA
  • Initially the BRA had strong local support for independence however their wanton destruction of virtually all infrastructure on the island turned many away from the cause. But in 2019, 98% of Bougainvilleans voted for independence, especially those that lived in the north and on Buka Island.
  • Human rights abuses against the security forces and against locals that supported the rule of law exacerbated the crisis and did not help their cause internationally.
  • The reluctance of the leaders especially Ona and Kaouna to meet and negotiate, particularly in Arawa in 1994, prolonged the conflict.
  • The BRA leaders often failed to engage the women of Bougainville (the landowners) in local ceasefire arrangements or accept that the women had a role to play in resolving the crisis.

• The PNG National Government
• Appeared overwhelmed by the crisis and almost daily, contradictory initiatives both for peace and military operations were being announced.
• Neither the government nor the opposition were able to offer a clear pathway towards ending the fighting as a first step in de-escalating the crisis. Nor did they have the financial resources to support a military hard power response to defeat the BRA.
• Too often the objectives of the national government in Port Moresby were ignored by on-ground commanders who were more interested in payback and their own desires to attain promotion/accolades.
• The Australian Government
• Seemed to have no clear policy regarding Bougainville and ministers were often quoted as saying that the “crisis” was an internal problem for PNG to resolve. In fact, the war had already spilled over into the Solomon Islands and PNG’s border with Indonesia remained unpatrolled for some years due to defence force commitments on Bougainville. The crisis was also being discussed and monitored by the United Nations Security Council and Amnesty International. Australia had provided helicopters, uniforms and small arms ammunition – hardly an “internal problem” for PNG.
• Was indecisive and made demands on the PNG government and the security forces, such as no gunships which made their tasks even harder; and sent conflicting messages to all parties. At the time, there were very few Australian military and civilian decision makers who knew much about PNG. After Independence in 1975, PNG was treated as a backwater posting. This resulted in poor and ill-informed advice to government on how to help resolve the crisis.
• Maybe, as in the Solomon Islands intervention a decade or so later, Australia should have provided greater support and leadership to PNG and the people of Bougainville by requesting other Pacific nations to become involved sooner, thus providing a more Melanesian perspective rather than an Australian one.
• It also became obvious during the crisis that the Australian Government failed to effectively communicate with New Zealand and on occasions there were different and contradictory policies being pursued by both governments.

In December 1992, I was posted to the High Commission in Port Moresby as the Deputy Head of the Defence Staff. The new HOM, Mr Bill Farmer, told me that after considering my past service in PNG he wanted my primary responsibility to be reporting on and visiting Bougainville!

Postscript

After writing this piece, I requested 2 to 3 close friends with previous service in PNG to review and provide feedback. The feedback has caused me to add a postscript. The deployment to Bougainville in January 1990 was dangerous. We had very limited information and the success we achieved primarily depended on our own on-ground initiatives. This included organising meetings with the security forces, with BCL, shipping lines, businessmen, village elders, transport and our accommodation and rationing especially after the Siromba Hotel closed. I also attempted to get messages to the BRA that I was not there to advise or aid the security forces; the role I was given was a facilitation of those wanting to leave, and to report. I don’t recall ever discussing what would happen if we had been wounded or injured as we were on our own.

 I approached the challenge from a different perspective to John Robbs. I had lived and soldiered in PNG, albeit years before; I was comfortable in the environment and enjoyed mixing with the locals. I also had a reasonable grasp of Neo-Melanesian Pidgin; John had not been to PNG before and was understandably uncomfortable, however he did a good job. While I did not underestimate the danger, I felt after 12 months in Lebanon in 1983-84, I was sufficiently situationally aware to survive Bougainville as I had confidence in my ability to operate with the locals and security forces, Leo Nuia aside.

My reviewers also raised the point that I had skirted around the issue of human rights abuses. Abuses occurred on all sides with the local people especially paying a high toll when caught between the security forces and the BRA. Payback killings were common. The security forces committed numerous unspeakable acts upon the rebels and vice versa.

After more than 30 years, I do not intend to detail the incidents I was made aware of, and reported regularly back to Canberra, especially as no criminal charges were ever laid in PNG. But shocking human rights abuses did occur and yes, the higher levels of Government and Defence in PNG and Australia were fully aware of what was happening on their doorstep. Why charges were not pursued by either government, is not a question I am qualified to answer.

Now 33 years later, the issue of independence remains unresolved even though in the 2019 referendum, 98% of Bougainvilleans voted for independence. Currently the PNG Government and the Government for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville are discussing proposals for 2027, although it appears both sides remain determined to hold the positions they have had since the crisis began.

Garry Young, CSM

July 2023