Back Again
After a break of a few days in Port Moresby during which time John Robbs replaced me, I returned via Buka Island (north of Bougainville) and a long drive on poor gravel roads south to Arawa. John did the reverse drive north to Buka the next day. On arrival I learned that the Phantom was closing the hotel and evacuating. My communicator and I would need to move elsewhere as the BRA were starting to target the hotel with small arms fire most nights. I tried to find out why, but I did not receive a clear answer. We were spoilt for choice as not far from Kieta was Happy Valley, a beautiful area with many vacant houses and across the road from the beach. We found one house that was ideal for communications, had several covered exit routes should the need arise, and a functioning generator. There was plenty of pasta, rice and other tinned food plus food from the Siromba Hotel gifted to us. In addition, a billiard table was located downstairs in our new abode. I did not conduct any operational activities at night for obvious reasons, so the billiard table was a bonus. Catching fish from the jetty was a regular pastime to supplement our hard rations, although the sharks would often grab our catch just as we were about to haul it onto the jetty.

Several recreational 30 to 40-foot cruisers were left at anchor in the bay and one owner offered his boat as an evacuation option if needed. Otherwise, he wanted it sunk to prevent the BRA from using it for medical evacuation to, and smuggling from, the Solomon Islands. I recall John Robbs advising on our handover he had paddled out to the boat and let the bungs out. What a waste. He rightly decided when he was doing his tour on the island that we did not have the qualifications to sail it to the Solomon Islands. We had previously agreed that the route out on completion of our tasks would be hitching a ride on a helicopter or driving back north to Buka.

As the number of evacuations reduced, I was informed that our mission would be ending in March 1990. In preparation for our withdrawal, I headed south to Aropa to talk to the Kiwi civilian pilots flying the UH1H Iroquois (Huey) helicopters supporting the PNGDF. Initially they had been assigned a PNGDF rifle company to provide local security for the aircraft and crews. However, the company had been withdrawn by Leo Nuia (and I’m not sure why). So the helicopters and crews remained at Aropa near the fuel farm (drummed fuel) with no security except for a few claymore mines, barbed wire fencing and personal weapons.

The pilots and crew were stressed as they were worried about the BRA attacking their camp. As well, the PNGDF air tasking was haphazard and often their missions were altered in flight by the senior PNGDF officer on board.

The Hueys that had been provided to the PNGDF by the Australian Government had not been approved to be configured as gunships nor did they have armoured protection in the seats for the pilots. So, instead of fixed mounted M60 machine guns, weapons were held by toggle ropes hanging from the side doors. Without any stabilizing, the machine guns were widely inaccurate when used in a strafing role and the spent cartridges flew up into the blades and engine manifold area, increasing the danger of malfunction. Fortunately, no Hueys were brought down as I am convinced the BRA would not have treated the pilots well. I was told by the pilots that on occasions they were told to fly low along certain roads so soldiers could throw grenades at vehicles that may have been transporting BRA rebels. Another breach of the conditions of use of the aircraft, but the pilots had no choice but to comply.

March 1990, the almost Coup

In early March, the High Commission communicator and I withdrew to Port Moresby via Buka and Rabaul. Not long after, the High Commission became aware that, on the authority of Colonel Nuia, the PNGDF withdrew from Arawa to Buka Island. I believe this was done without the knowledge of HQ PNGDF or the PNG Government and a sea and air blockade was subsequently proclaimed. The PNGDF did not return to Arawa until 1992, giving the BRA a free reign as the controlling authority; they declared independence during that time, which was ignored by the international community. This was one of two significant events that occurred while John and I were in Port Moresby post Bougainville.

The second major event was an interesting insight into Melanesian politics. I was leaving the High Commission in Waigani, Port Moresby, one evening in March 1990, when I got a call on my hand-held radio from Lt Col Mike Dennis (aka the Red Fox) to turn around and head towards the Golf Club and Parliament House. On meeting Mike, he advised that the Police Commissioner Paul Tohian had been drinking heavily at Taurama Barracks (the home of 1 PIR) outside Port Moresby. Apparently Tohian and the soldiers were frustrated with the government’s handling of the Bougainville crisis and decided that they could do a better job.

Mike heard that Tohian had mobilised several riot squads and was deploying them to critical infrastructure within the city such as Parliament House, the radio station, EM TV and the airport. He asked me to help him monitor the situation by checking key locations while Mike did the same and kept the HOM, Allan Taylor informed. I saw many RPNGC flashing blue lights and police vehicles speeding around the city packed with heavily armed police and I encountered a few checkpoints, where I was questioned and politely waved through. However, I didn’t have the experience Mike had.

According to Mike, when he drove up to Parliament House the guard post was abandoned, but sitting on the steps were Ted Diro, former Commander PNGDF and his adopted son Siali, a fine PNGDF officer. They were positioned to defend the Parliamentary building with an M60 machine gun and a couple of belts of ammunition. We later heard that Paul Tohian, after calling out the mobile squads, had gone home and fallen asleep.

The next day Sean Dorney, the highly-respected ABC journalist, wrote a newspaper piece with the headline Bar-B-Coup fails – classic Sean.

Debriefing

On completion of our tasks in Bougainville, John and I spent time in Port Moresby briefing other missions including the British, US and New Zealanders as they did not have representation on the island and were very interested in our insights. We drafted our reports independently to ensure we covered all aspects of the mission, but our assessments were consistent. We were asked to speak to some PNG politicians with Allan Taylor the HOM and his political and consular officers in attendance. The ignorance of the situation on Bougainville by some PNG politicians was staggering.

I’m not sure about John, but I felt quite flat when we left Port Moresby for home as we had lived an intense few months. The experience of operating independently in a “conflict zone” was professionally invaluable, as was working with the High Commission staff as I had not previously been exposed to major diplomatic/political considerations. John and I were advised to pass our reports, which had been presented to the HOM, through our chain of command. In my case, that was through Colonel Mike Keating the Commandant LWC. Interestingly, neither John nor I were interviewed or asked to visit Canberra to discuss our on-ground insights to a crisis which was getting worse not better. The only questions I received were from members of the Officers Mess at LWC. No, I did not follow up my report as I didn’t think it appropriate to seek an explanation as to why we were urgently summonsed for a deployment to a dangerous environment with virtually no support and 10 weeks later nobody in Canberra had any questions or it seemed, interest?? As before the deployment, I continued to follow the crisis using open- source media reporting while I remained posted to LWC.

Part 4: Conclusions and Postscript