by Peter Jesser
On 23 July 1942, the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) carried out the first ambush of the Japanese in Papua. Although this action is important historically, it has generally been poorly covered in military histories. It is not possible to return to 1942 and observe the full story as it unfolded, but there are enough generally available resources and individual accounts to place the history in context.
This paper will sketch in the main points and will hopefully provide a guide to other writers seeking to cover the topic in the future.
The PIB
On 24 June 1942, New Guinea Force established Maroubra Force comprising the 39th Battalion (less one company), the PIB, and appropriate supply and medical detachments. In the event of a Japanese landing, Maroubra Force would act to delay any advance from Awala to Kokoda, with the intention of forestalling any Japanese movement in the direction of Port Moresby across the Owen Stanley Range.[1] The reason that Maroubra Force was ordered to concentrate on delaying an advance from Awala to Kokoda reflected the fact that the Japanese, if they landed, could establish themselves at any point – and possibly more than one point – on a fairly long coastline. There would be no hope of the relatively small Maroubra Force offering firm resistance at all the possible landing points. But whatever the Japanese starting point, all the main tracks would lead them to Awala, and from there to Kokoda.
In late June 1942, Major Bill Watson[2], CO of the PIB, reached the Kokoda-Awala area with about 120 Papuan soldiers and a handful of European officers and NCOs. Fifty of the Papuans were placed in the Buna area under Lieutenant Bill Wort. As the 39th Battalion had not yet crossed to Kokoda, Watson took up responsibility for planning a defence.
The PIB set up their base at Wasida, near Awala, and then proceeded to walk the tracks between Kokoda and Awala. In the words of Captain Harold Jesser[3], OC A Company, it was “just up and down” learning the ground in detail. All the while, Japanese planes were flying overhead looking, it seemed, at the same tracks that the PIB were tramping.
At 1200 on 21 July 1942, Watson, Jesser and the PIB Adjutant, Lieutenant Colin Goodman arrived at their Wasida headquarters on their way back from Kokoda. At 1800 Watson received a memo from the District Officer, Captain Tom Grahamslaw “re explosions heard out to sea from Buna.”[4] Grahamslaw’s terse note told Watson that something was happening – and sooner than Maroubra Force might have wished. The Japanese had landed between Gona and Buna that afternoon. The invading force was the Yokoyama Advance Party.
The Japanese had arrived in strength – at least compared to that of the defenders. The initial force comprised of the main strength of the 15th Independent Engineer Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Company, 1st Battalion of the 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and elements of the 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (SLNF). There were also approximately five hundred members of the Formosan Takasago Volunteers, Korean labourers and some two thousand New Guineans impressed as carriers. A forward section consisting of one infantry company (135 men with bicycles) was loaded onto motor transport and headed immediately towards Kokoda.[5] They were supported by a 70-millimetre field gun, one platoon from the Machine Gun Company, another platoon from the Engineer Regiment, and elements of the SLNF. A highly-mobile and well-armed leading force of around 250 Japanese with carrier support was soon far from the landing zone and heading up the track towards Kokoda. [6]
At 0600 the next morning, 22 July, a further report was received from Grahamslaw reporting bombing and machinegunning at Buna the previous day. At 0630 Watson and Jesser left for Awala to find that Grahamslaw was already on his way to Buna to conduct a reconnaissance. Watson would now make his own plans to meet the invaders.
Lieutenant John Chalk had been left at Wasida assembling a platoon and preparing them for action. Jesser returned with orders to proceed to Awala and, at 1030 that day, Jesser and Chalk left Wasida with 35 PIB soldiers, arriving at Awala at 1100. Chalk’s report[7] describes the events that followed, with Watson giving Jesser and Chalk orders regarding their role in the Buna area. There was no knowing what the Japanese intentions were. If they were going to start by setting up a base at Buna it would be useful to establish an observation post. Watson instructed Jesser to identify a suitable observation point in the mountains overlooking Buna and to advise the missionaries at Dobodura – in the strongest possible terms – that they should get out while they still could.
At 1115, Jesser and Chalk left Awala with their platoon, arriving at Isagahambo at 1400. Here they contacted WO2 Bitmead[8], an ANGAU Medical Orderly, who told them he had posted one hundred Papuan carriers along the track to Sangara with orders to fell trees, the intention being to impede any Japanese advance.
Men from the PIB patrol in the Buna area were now beginning to appear along the track as they made their way back towards Awala. The first group included Lieutenant Wort and Lieutenant Allan Champion (ANGAU) who had assessed the situation as the Japanese landings became imminent. They had gone to the signals hut only to find that the signallers had already departed. Wort and Champion destroyed the code books and transmitter and set out for Awala, taking what troops they had with them.[9]
Wort’s fifty Papuans were not all at Buna. Some were patrolling up the coast towards Gona and were in a position to observe what was taking place. None could have offered any resistance to the Japanese.
Private (later WO2 in the post-war PIR) Paul Lafe was with a section to the north of Buna when the landings commenced. Wisely, the Papuans decided it was time to go. Lafe and his fellow soldiers made their way back towards Awala, to link up, first with Wort and then with Jesser. After debriefing by Jesser, Wort’s group continued on to report to Watson at Awala.[10]
Another section of Wort’s detachment led by Corporal (later Sergeant) Francis[11] had been sent to Bakembari. These men were heading back to Buna in the late afternoon when they saw Japanese ships in the bay being attacked by Allied bombers. The men retired to the bush and prepared their evening meal. Francis, however, was worried that they were too close to the Japanese for safety. He soon ordered his men to move out and they spent the night in the bush. The next day Corporal Francis was leading his men back towards Awala when they came upon Jesser and Chalk with their platoon coming from the other direction. This time Jesser did not send Francis and his men on to Awala, as he had with Wort’s party. Instead, he obtained what information he could from Francis and added the men to his own patrol. [12]
Jesser and Chalk now had a better idea of what lay ahead but they were a long way from the coast, and no one had any idea what the Japanese had been doing since the landings. They proceeded towards Sangara until, at 1430, Jesser left Chalk and continued on to Dobodura with a few of the Papuans. Jesser continues:
“Johnny went down to Sangara plantation house [Mason’s house] to cook tea. There was plenty of stuff there. They had all cleared out. I went over to warn the missionaries at Dobadura. That was about the end of the day. I was just coming back, walking down the track and I saw these fellows standing at the gate. The house was … oh … about two hundred yards back from the track.” Jesser conveyed the puzzlement he felt as he recalled the incident. “I saw these fellows standing at the gate. About eight or ten of them … ten or twelve … standing at the gate. And all of a sudden it dawned on me – they were bloomin’ Japs!”
It was getting dark, and Jesser was about two hundred metres from the Japanese. He had not expected that the enemy would be this far inland so soon. It was when he saw the bicycles that Jesser realised who they were. Chalk had posted sentries, but the Japanese had got past them before the alarm could be raised.
Mason’s house was set well back from the track and was surrounded by a high hedge. Jesser continued:
“I don’t know whether I went through it or over this great big hedge on the side of the road. The grass was about waist deep. I ran across and into the back of the house and sang out to John, ‘For Christ’s sake get out, the Japs are at the front gate!’
And he left the tea cooking. We left it for the Japs.”
John Chalk recalled that Mason’s house had been well-stocked. He had some roast vegetables cooking and they had all the cigarettes they could wish for. His recollection of the incident was exactly the same as Jesser’s. Chalk got out, but he only had time to grab his Thompson sub-machine gun and his report. Only later did he realise that he had left his spare magazines for the Thompson behind. But they got away undetected and stayed in the garden behind the house for a time to see what the Japanese would do. Then Jesser went back to contact the Sisters at Sangara Mission while Chalk collected his men and retired to a position where they could cover the tracks leading towards Awala from both the plantation and Sangara Mission.[13]
At 1915 Jesser returned with food obtained from the Mission sisters. He had told the sisters that they should evacuate but they refused to leave. That decision would cost them their lives.
Having reached Sangara, the Japanese would have known that Australian forces were in the vicinity. But as long as the PIB patrol remained undetected the Japanese would not know what strength they faced. Jesser and Chalk, on the other hand, still had the opportunity to gather intelligence for future action.
Scouts were posted on the Sangara track to monitor the movements of the Japanese. Later that night, Chalk took a patrol of four native soldiers back into Sangara to assess the situation.[14] The Japanese were then occupying Mason’s house and outbuildings. Chalk and his men watched the Japanese through a screen of dense bush and rain for most of the night, but no estimate of enemy strength could be obtained.
The PIB remained in position at the track junction until well past midnight. Jesser had despatched a runner to inform Watson that they had sighted the enemy, but now he needed to inform Watson what actions they were implementing. In the circumstances he could not use another runner. At 0300 Jesser instructed Chalk to take his platoon and withdraw towards Awala, destroying bridges and barricading the road as he went. Jesser then went on ahead to make his report to his CO.
At Awala things were happening fast and Watson was dealing with information from several sources. Radio communications told him no more than he already knew – that the Japanese had landed. He knew that Grahamslaw’s patrol had encountered the Japanese and been scattered. He had also debriefed Wort and he knew that Jesser and Chalk had sighted the Japanese.
It now seemed prudent to reinforce Jesser and Chalk’s platoon so, at 0615, Watson sent Lieutenant Wort with thirteen Papuans as additional support. Watson did not have much to work with, but he was preparing the PIB to make a stand.
At 0800 Jesser reached Awala and reported that Chalk was withdrawing towards Hagenahambo, destroying bridges and blocking the track with logs to slow down the advance of the Japanese. The intention was to impede those using bicycles. But the time had come to make the first stand. At 0910 Watson sent WO2 McWatters to Chalk with a simple, hand-written, five-word order: “You will engage the enemy.”
The ambush
At 1000, after a brief rest and something to eat, Jesser received new instructions: he was to take a patrol through to Tonana and up the Ioma road. Watson needed to be sure he would not be outflanked. In the meantime, as radio communications to Kokoda were evidently not being received, Captain Sam Templeton of the 39th Battalion left Awala for Kokoda to bring members of the 39th Battalion forward. B Company of the 39th had been the first to begin crossing the mountains and three platoons of that Company had already reached Kokoda. One was being retained there to defend the airfield. The other two were making their way forward when Templeton met up with them. Lieutenant Seekamp’s 11 Platoon was sent hurrying to Awala while Lieutenant Mortimore’s 12 Platoon was ordered to take up a position near Gorari.[15]
At 1500, Jesser returned from his patrol to report that no enemy had been sighted and at 1515 Seekamp’s platoon reached Awala. Now Watson had another thirty soldiers to strengthen his defences. It was too late to get them into Chalk’s position, but the extra platoon gave him more options. Seekamp’s platoon also had a machine gun – a Lewis gun – which was firepower that the PIB lacked. Unfortunately, there was only one magazine for the Lewis gun so it would be of limited use once the shooting began.
Watson had no idea what the enemy forces were just a short way down the track from his position, but the more time he could buy, the more chance there was that reinforcements could be flown to Kokoda. Between Awala and Kokoda, Watson knew the country and knew every place that he could set an ambush. His first ambush site was already prepared at Ongahambo just a few kilometres to the west.
At 1550, Chalk’s ambush was sprung. Chalk had Papuans monitoring the progress of the Japanese force and was as prepared as he could be to meet them at his chosen site “1,000 yards east of Awala.” Chalk selected a position on a hill, in a native garden, where the Japanese would have to advance down one hill and up another to reach the ambush site. His force was split – half were with Chalk looking down one side of the ambush site, the others with Wort covering the opposite side.
In John Chalk’s words:
“The Japanese eventually arrived, preceded by native carriers, so I had to hold my fire until the Japanese soldiers came into view. I gave the order to fire, and the Japanese immediately swung into action with mortars and woodpecker machine guns.”[16]
Chalk was certain that the ambush had inflicted casualties. It is unlikely that such an ambush would not. He said that initially the Japanese milled around in confusion, and he could see individuals fall to the ground when they were hit by PIB fire. How many were killed or wounded he could not say. But the Japanese quickly recovered and swung into action. Heavy machine guns and mortars were firepower beyond the understanding of the Papuan soldiers who quickly melted away into the bush. Hopelessly outnumbered by a greatly superior force of well-armed and battle-hardened Japanese, Chalk had to break off the engagement and withdraw – or as he later put it: “I suddenly realised I was the only one still firing.”
Chalk was in no position to do a head count and had to make his best ‘guesstimate’ of the force he was facing. He knew he was far outnumbered, and the weapons brought into action by the Japanese overwhelmed his force. He could identify both heavy and light machine guns in addition to rifle fire. Mortar fire was also directed at the PIB positions. The Japanese “knee mortar” (similar to a grenade launcher) could be brought into action very quickly. Chalk thought there may also have been an artillery piece or a heavy mortar. The Yokoyama Advance Party certainly had these weapons. The PIB faced impossible odds and weaponry, but they still carried out their ambush before they ‘melted away.’[17]
Bill Wort was opposite Chalk in the ambush position. Wort[18] said Chalk called out to him, “How many of your boys are left, Bill?”
Wort replied “None” and Chalk said, “I’ve got none either. Let’s get out of here.”
The two followed their retreating troops back towards Awala where the sounds of the ambush had been heard clearly. According to Col Goodman, when the firing erupted Jesser said, “I’d better go and give Johnny a hand.” But Watson held him back. Instead, he ordered Jesser to take a small patrol – with Sergeant Katue as NCO – and screen Chalk’s right flank. Then Jesser was to continue on to gather what further information he could about the Japanese and, if possible, contact the missionaries at Dobodura and tell them again to flee, for their own safety. This Jesser and Katue did – but that is another story.
Troops from the ambush were now trickling into Awala. Col Goodman recalled the Papuans returning “with eyes like saucers.” It had been an awesome baptism of fire. Many of them were missing but gradually they resumed their composure and most rejoined their unit over subsequent days. Only a few – those who had family in Northern Papua – went back to their villages and did not return. However, his scattered Papuans were only part of the problem. Watson’s attention was focused on defending the track from Awala to Kokoda – and doing so with only a handful of troops. From the sounds of the ambush he had just heard, Watson knew he could not hold the Japanese in check for long.
But first there was the matter of Awala itself. Awala was a valuable resource which could not just be left to the enemy. According to Lieutenant Clen Searle who was present and who owned Awala plantation, Watson handed him a box of matches and instructed him to burn the place. Searle said “No. You burn it. That way I can claim compensation from the Government after the war.” Either way, Awala was put to the torch.[19]
At 1620, while this was happening, Watson ordered Seekamp and his platoon to cover the withdrawal of the PIB and to hold at Awala for thirty minutes after their departure. They were then to fall back to Ongahambo where a dump of food and ammunition had already been established for the purpose of effecting a further stand. This was the foundation for a textbook fighting withdrawal, with two forces successively striking at an enemy, withdrawing through each other’s positions, and striking at the enemy again as they followed up. But things did not go according to plan.
Sergeant Les Martorana, 39th Battalion, had been detailed to take a section of 11 platoon and cover the log bridge creek crossing just to the east of Awala. Behind him, Awala was being burned. According to Martorana, the men had been instructed to rendezvous with the rest of the force at the Wairope. This was contrary to Watson’s orders, but Martorana’s instructions may have been given to him earlier either by Lieutenant Seekamp or Captain Stevenson of the 39th. Martorana followed his orders as he understood them and waited until after sunset before withdrawing. He recalled Awala being “just red embers” when they passed through.[20] He believed there were Japanese in the bush all around, but he and his men were not fired on.
At Wasida, the PIB officers collected and destroyed maps and documents before going on to Ongahambo where they learned that, contrary to orders, Seekamp had withdrawn his platoon to the Wairope. Watson had no choice but to burn his stores and ammunition at Ongahambo and follow Seekamp to the Wairope. It was an inauspicious beginning.
Writers who have not done sufficient research have made much of a supposed 39th Battalion ambush of the Japanese at Awala. Some suggest that they were supported by the PIB. Others make no mention of the PIB. But the fact is that the only ambush of the Japanese at that time was carried out by the PIB – and by the PIB alone. It was the first ambush of the Japanese in Papua, and it was executed about “1,000 yards east of Awala”.
There was no battle at Awala itself. In the official Australian War History, McCarthy passes over Seekamp’s withdrawal to the Wairope as being the result of “some confusion” following Watson’s order.[21] In the 39th Battalion War Diary it is stated that “Owing to superior numerical strength of the enemy, our troops were obliged to withdraw to Wairope after a brief exchange of fire.”[22] Martorana was there. He does not mention any exchange of fire, but he was of the belief that there were Japanese machine guns all around their position.
The Japanese war history confirms the timeline set out in the PIB War Diary. The Japanese first dealt with the PIB in Chalk’s ambush before encountering the 39th at Awala. According to the Japanese, they “.… attacked Awala just as the main strength of B Company [Seekamp’s platoon], on hearing the alarm, prepared to rush out of the village…. The battle at Awala …. was over almost as soon as it started.”[23] The Japanese do not refer to any exchange of fire.
Based on these three sources, it would seem there was nothing which might have constituted a “battle” at Awala involving the 39th Battalion.
Watson had his hands full at this stage and the speed at which things were happening can mask the purposefulness of the actions taken by the defenders. But as this history and timeline shows, the first ambush of the Japanese in Papua did not come about by mere happenstance. It was the result of planning decisions taken by the PIB as the conflict began to take shape. Despite what many historians have claimed (based, it should be noted, on no historical sources) the 39th Battalion took no part in the PIB ambush of the Japanese east of Awala on 23 July 1942. The first shots of any consequence fired by the 39th Battalion appear to have been when they opposed the Japanese crossing of the Kumusi at the Wairope the following day. This was followed by a more substantial ambush of the Japanese at Gorari on 25 July 1942. But by then both the PIB and the 39th were settling more into their role as fighting troops.
Conclusion
Neither the PIB nor the 39th performed flawlessly from the start. But no unit in its first combat does that. It is an unfortunate fact that many historians have glossed over the shortcomings of the 39th Battalion in the early days of the Kokoda Campaign at the same time as they have implied criticism of the PIB. History – and historians – need to give the PIB their due as the first ground troops to carry out an ambush of the Japanese Army in Papua.
(October 2022)
References
[1] McCarthy, D. 1959. South-West Pacific Area – First Year: Kokoda to Wau. Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p. 114.
[2] Major W.T. Watson MC and bar, DCM. Watson would shortly be awarded the DSO for his leadership in the battles for Kokoda.
[3] Captain (later Major) H.J. Jesser who would be awarded the MC for his work around Awala and Sangara following the Japanese landings. Tape recordings and notes from interviews with Harold Jesser are used throughout this history.
[4] PIB War Diary, AWM52.
[5] Bullard, Steven (trans) Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, New Britain and Papua Campaigns, 1942-43, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2007, pp. 116, 124.
[6] Cameron, David W. 2020. The Battles for the Kokoda Plateau. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p. 96.
[7] Byrnes, G.M. 1989. Green Shadows. Self-published, Newmarket, Brisbane, p. 206.
[8] Bitmead was captured by the Japanese. He was subjected to a number of mock executions but managed to escape from where he was being held and make his way back to join the Australians some days later.
[9] Sinclair, J. 1991. To Find a Path: The Life and Times of the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment. Booralong Publications, Bowen Hills, Brisbane, p. 136.
[10] Ibid., pp. 138-9.
[11] Francis Tutuveta was generally referred to by the name Francis, but some accounts refer to him as Tutuveta. He would later be promoted to Sergeant.
[12] Sinclair, ibid., pp. 137-8.
[13] Williams has described the Japanese appearing at Sangara Mission (sic)[ it was Sangara Plantation which was a different location] while Chalk and Grahamslaw were “taking breakfast”. But this supposed encounter is pure fiction. The two men were never together as their separate accounts (and that of Jesser) demonstrate. (Williams, Peter. The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth and Reality, Cambridge, Melbourne, 2012, p. 50).
[14] The patrol included Corporal (later Sergeant) Gabriel Lahari and Corporal George Meta. Ibid., p. 140.
[15] Austin, Victor. 1988. To Kokoda and Beyond: The Story of the 39th Battalion 1941-1943. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, pp. 86-87.
[16] John Chalk, personal account in the possession of the author.
[17] Some writers have attributed this ambush to the 39th Battalion. Others have stated that it was the 39th and the PIB. But the 39th was not involved. The ambush was carried out by the PIB alone.
[18] Bill Wort, personal account in the possession of the author.
[19] Searle, Jesse Lillian (Pat). 1995. Memini – I remember- recollections of my life with Clendyn Edwy Searle in Australia and Papua New Guinea. MS 9425, National Library of Australia.
[20] Martorana’s account was provided shortly before his death. He states that Templeton ordered them to cover the creek crossing and to withdraw to the Wairope later. However, Templeton was not there at that time and it seems that Martorana confused the name with Stevenson. Martorana’s account seems to be basically correct in that he describes Awala having been burned and he fixes the time of their withdrawal with the fall of darkness. Darkness at Awala at that time would have been about 1815 following sunset at 1800. (Jenkin, Owen (ed.) Mud over Blood revisited: Stories from the 39th Battalion, 1941-1943, Kokoda to Gona compiled by Carl Johnson, History House, Blackburn Victoria, 2012, p. 76.)
[21] McCarthy, op. cit., p. 125.
[22] 39th Battalion War Diary, AWM 52, Item No: 8/3/78.
[23] Bullard, Steven (trans) Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area, New Britain and Papua Campaigns, 1942-43, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2007, p. 160.