Bruce Hunt, Australia’s Northern Shield?: Papua New Guinea and the Defence of Australia since 1880, Monash University Publishing, Carlton Victoria, 2017. ISBN 9781925495409. 374 pages, softcover, 13 Black and White photos, maps, bibliography and index. RRP $ 39.95 AUD.
It is very concise because it does not contain digressions, or superfluous words, or excessive reasoning. It is very clear because it is told in chronological order, without confounding the people it is about, or equivocating its meaning. It is very truthful because the author is himself, and so he seems in his style, trustworthy and free of all passions.
These remarks by the Spanish censor, Francisco de Castro, in 1617 reflect my view of this valuable history which started its life as a doctoral thesis in 2003. In this book, Bruce Hunt analyses the intersection of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea on Australia’s defence policy and the influence, over the course of 100 years, of Cabinet Ministers and public servants on our official relationships with these neighbours.
Hunt uses four broad and evolving themes as he views the islands of New Guinea from the perspective of Australian officials. Within each theme, Hunt examines, in chronological order, the defence issues for a defined period of time. This clear structure allows the reader to begin with the time period of most interest and then browse or study the other periods as they wish. Also, the precise headings for each chapter allow the reader to initially peruse the geographical territory (either West New Guinea or Indonesia or Papua New Guinea) of their preference.
Although Hunt allocates only six pages to the Second World War in New Guinea, what emerges is the perception that this War was a turning point in Australia’s relations with New Guinea. Before that War, our parliamentarians attached more importance to New Guinea than our military advisers. After that War, the situation was reversed. Hunt refers to several notable War historians and yet he agrees with the controversial position of Dr Peter Stanley that Japan did not invade Australia during the War. Unfortunately, despite his experience as a diplomat in PNG, Hunt is mistaken here in accepting Stanley’s position at face value. International legal convention would hold that Japan invaded Australia when her armed forces invaded the Australian Territory of Papua.
With Hunt’s scholarly use of sources and the integration of extracts from Cabinet Notebooks, this book throws up some revelations about several Cabinet leaders such as Sir Robert Menzies, Sir John McEwen and Gough Whitlam. For example, Robert Menzies’ statement in London in February 1965 that Australia’s first obligation was the ‘almost instinctive obligation, unwritten but nonetheless, to do all…to help Britain’ while the sixth and final obligation was ‘the territorial defence of Australia itself’. At the same meeting, with the UK and New Zealand Prime Ministers, Menzies admitted that, “he found it very difficult to get clear in his own mind what the priorities were.” Menzies basic pre-occupation with, and priority given to, Britain may explain why, in May 1965, he consulted Britain first (ahead of the USA and South Vietnam) in committing an Australian battalion to fight in Vietnam.
Another possible surprise for some readers is the Cabinet evidence that John McEwen dominated, and overshadowed Menzies, in foreign and defence policy for a long time. Hunt describes “McEwen’s leading role” in these areas and shows that “no decision was taken (in Cabinet) on Australia’s security policies in the 1950s and 1960s without his full support.” McEwen’s power of persuasion in Cabinet, however, had consequences for the defence budget including TPNG. Hunt observes, “In the 1950s and early 1960s (McEwen) had argued that Australia’s need for economic development should be placed ahead of financing the nation’s defence.”
Unexpected also is Hunt’s evidence of the continuity and change, in policy towards TPNG, which marked the tenure of the Whitlam Government. Hunt provides evidence of the ALP’s historic attention to New Guinea and Gough Whitlam’s personal familiarity with the Territory. For example, Andrew Fisher (ALP) told Parliament in 1901 that, “…it would be better…if we could secure the whole of New Guinea.” Hunt chronicles the repeated resistance from the U.K. Government to state or federal plans to annex or occupy the island of New Guinea and near by islands. That 1901 wish was resurrected in a (rejected) ALP proposal to the Menzies Government in 1954 that Australia ought to purchase West New Guinea from the Dutch Government. Whitlam’s understanding of PNG issues is underscored in a footnote endorsement by Chief Minister Somare in 1972, that “he had been impressed with Mr Whitlam in the past and that many of the things he had said during his visit in 1970 had had the agreement of the Pangu Party.” In 1973, however, it was Whitlam’s deputy Lance Barnard who supported the removal of a PNG ‘defence treaty’ from the ALP Policy and approved a fundamentally new approach of defence disengagement from PNG. The reader could reasonably ask whether that particular Labor Cabinet “threw the Whitlam baby out with the Menzies bathwater”?
The currently powerful rise of the Indonesian economy carries implications for Australian defence policy in addition to the opportunities, for example in education and trade. This text could be relevant background reading for Australian officials working in defence or other agencies with Indonesia. The audience for this book would also include researchers and people with a political, historical or military interest in PNG. Hunt’s perspective is that of Australian, mainly Canberra, thinkers and decision-makers about regional, strategic issues.
PNG voices are generally lacking, especially the voices of senior PNG military officers, and the PNG primary sources are very limited. The photo chosen by the publisher for the front cover of the book focusses on Sir Michael Somare (sitting with Gough Whitlam and Bill Morrison). Yet Somare is not adequately portrayed in the text despite his agency in the Australian-PNG relationship – for example, he postponed the date for Independence (and Whitlam agreed). Further consideration could have been given to the book’s sub-title. Taking into account the number of chapters allocated to West New Guinea and Indonesia, it may have been more accurate to use New Guinea Island (rather than Papua New Guinea) in the sub-title.
Consistent with his doctoral thesis, Hunt’s PNG focus, especially in the later chapters, is on the post-Independence defence relationship with Australia, which was settled in 1977. For this book, Hunt has added a final chapter to cover the joint declarations of 1987 and 2013. Although Hunt deals with Sir Michael Somare and Sir Albert Maori Kiki, the audience in PNG may find limited analysis of the role of their agencies in the international relationship. The PNG universities, and possibly the defence headquarters, may be interested in this book yet they may also feel confronted by the historical evidence of the Australian politicians and public service leaders who damaged Australia’s reputation and relationship with the people of PNG.
Putting such concerns to one side, this book is a work of great scholarship and great interest. It is written in a dispassionate style with a careful choice of phrase and with the support of broad historical evidence. Hunt’s chapter notes are comprehensive and demonstrate his craft and consideration for the reader. I believe that Hunt has missed only the challenge posed by author Sean Dorney – a challenge he aimed to meet. Sean Dorney’s recent book extols the efficacy of non-government agencies whereas Hunt’s book documents the self-interest of Australian government agencies in handling PNG affairs. Finally, Hunt accepts the credibility of the Cabinet notes of the period at face value. It may be useful for everyone to heed the caution of one commentator who noted after the first Canberra meeting of Federal Cabinet on 30 January 1924, ‘the picture from Cabinet is never rounded or even necessarily accurate.’
Gregory J. Ivey