Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen. I am honoured to be able to share with you today my views on the war in the Pacific in 1942, particularly the Kokoda element. I am no historian but I do claim to know something about military operations, so here goes.

I have always been disappointed that the fighting withdrawal from Kokoda to Imita Ridge and the advance to the Papuan Coast have never been adequately recognized. I believe that the campaign deserves much greater credit as it was fought in some of the most difficult terrain in the world by troops, most of whom were unfamiliar with the jungle, were out-numbered and out-gunned for most of the time, had to be fed in piecemeal during the withdrawal phase and were hampered throughout by incredibly poor higher command mainly by remote control from Australia. I think the Infantry Commanders here will agree that the fighting withdrawal is the most difficult operation to undertake successfully.If all of that was not bad enough, the sacking of three commanders during the battles, two of whom were not only responsible for the tactical battle but were the PNG commanders as well, – this arrangement was unsound.

1942 was the critical year in the Pacific War, as far as Australia was concerned, as events in that year sowed the seeds of defeat for the Japanese, even though it would take another three years to drive them back to where they came from.

But, it started disastrously with the capture of Rabaul and Lae in PNG, Ambon and Timor in the East Indies, Malaya, Hong Kong and Singapore. It seemed that there was no stopping the Japanese juggernaut. Closer to home, Port Moresby was first bombed on 3 February and Darwin on 19 February.

It seemed to many that Australia was next on the list to be invaded and preparations were made to repel an attack. There was even talk of a scorched earth policy and I am sure many of you have heard of the Brisbane Line. The Japanese Navy wanted to invade Australia but the Army was convinced that they didn’t have the troops to successfully occupy such a large country. The Army view won so it was decided to complete isolating Australia by capturing all the northern airfields. The Japanese planners were well aware that they could expect an American- led counter attack and Port Moresby would complete the ring as they had all the others.

As all this was occurring, the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin demanded the return of the AIF Divisions from the Middle East. They were initially bound for Java but the Japanese beat them to it, so they were to be diverted to Burma. It was just as well that Curtin’s demand was met as the Burma campaign remains infamous in military history as there were so many more casualties to tropical diseases than bullets and our troops would have most likely been decimated.

I believe that victory in the Pacific depended on two elements – firstly domination of the sea and secondly ownership of the string of airstrips running from north to south.

In this regard it was very fortunate that the American aircraft carriers were at sea when Pearl Harbour was bombed. I have often wondered how the war in the Pacific would have progressed if they had been destroyed but I’ll leave that question to you.

We have all heard much about the Enigma machine developed by the British but not much has been said about the American and Australian code breakers located in Hawaii and Melbourne who cracked the Japanese Naval code in early 1942.

This led to the Allies being warned well in advance that the Japanese were going to mount a seaborne attack on Port Moresby in May and allowed an allied fleet to meet them in the Battle of the Coral Sea on 7 May.

The allies lost more ships than the Japanese, but it was a major allied victory. How could this be so? Firstly, the attack on Port Moresby was called off, not to be repeated from the sea, and secondly two Japanese aircraft carriers were damaged. This meant that they were not available for the attack on Midway Island two months later, which again the codebreakers made the Allied high command aware of. The Japanese lost four fleet carriers in this key battle which they were never able to replace and it was the beginning of the end for their domination of the sea.

But the Japanese still needed Port Moresby so they devised a new plan which was to launch a land-based attack from the north coast of Papua and cross the Owen Stanley mountains about which they knew nothing. They didn’t look too bad on the map and after all Kokoda was only about 100 miles from Port Moresby. They were certainly in for a shock. To support this attack there was a plan to land at Milne Bay as well, in the east, on the southern tip of PNG and perfect as a jumping off place for air raids against northern Australia, but again the codebreakers warned of the plan and the Australians were able to beat them to it and give them a welcome they didn’t expect.

Many people still ask why on earth wasn’t Port Moresby reinforced when it became clear that it was the next target. As I have mentioned the powers that be, both civil and military, seem to have been absolutely convinced that Australia was to be invaded, so the troops were needed to defend the homeland, particularly the AIF units. When the Japanese advance group of 2,000 landed at Buna the under strength 39th Battalion and the newly-enlarged Papuan Infantry Battalion were in the district to oppose them.

The Japanese Advance Guard reached Kokoda on 28th of July, and captured it briefly but they were then driven out by the Australians. However, then the Japanese main force arrived and the Australians were forced to withdraw to the south on 9 August. They were still fighting hard as they withdrew but were in real trouble when they were joined by the 21st Brigade, which arrived just in time. Even now the larger force was significantly out-numbered and out-gunned. For example, they were required to leave their heavy machine guns and mortars behind as they were regarded as being unnecessary, while the Japanese had both mortars and mountain guns.

I would like to divert from the main theme and relate a small story about a member of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, one PN4, Sgt Katue, who was the first member of that unit to be decorated. He was awarded the Military Medal. Katue’s citation centred around the fact that while on patrol he penetrated the Japanese lines on two occasions at great risk to himself to obtain information on the Japanese dispositions. But this was not the full story. While on patrol Katue became ill so he was left behind in a friendly village. When he recovered he declared his own war on the Japanese and local collaborators. He eventually turned up at an Australian outpost. His uniform was covered with Japanese rank and unit insignia, and dragging along a terrified Japanese prisoner. The insignia were from around 25 Japanese he had shot or killed with a machete when he ran out of ammunition. He also killed a number of villagers who he discovered were collaborating with the Japanese.

But back to the main story. General MacArthur, the Pacific commander, was convinced that the jungle between Kokoda and Port Moresby was impenetrable and was slow to react even after the Japanese landed at Buna. General Blamey the land commander basically did as MacArthur wished, but didn’t know anything about the battle space either.

Much worse though, was that no major military reconnaissance had been conducted of the area between January and June 1942, so it was a mystery to the defenders. As an example of just how ignorant they were, in July, when one of the heroes of the campaign, Bert Kienzle, a local planter accepted the job of managing the local labour, he was instructed to build a road from the start of the Trail to Kokoda by August – a timeframe of just six weeks.

But then began a brilliant fighting withdrawal. The terrain certainly helped the withdrawing troops as there was no room for massed attacks. The main Japanese tactic was to outflank the defenders, but each time the Australians who were later reinforced by the 25thAIF Brigade were just able to occupy the next position.

This continued until the last major ridge before Port Moresby, Imita Ridge, where the Brigade commander was told to hold the position or die there. History records that he held the position as the Japanese thrust had been blunted by then, if not defeated, and they were no longer capable of major offensive operations. In the Japanese three-week-long advance south towards Port Moresby, they lost 80% of their combat strength and the survivors were sick and hungry.

General MacArthur was very critical of the Australians’ efforts. He hadn’t been to Port Moresby and neither had General Blamey the land commander, whom he sent there in September. Blamey sacked General Rowell who had actually overseen a significant victory over a superior force. Neither Macarthur nor Blamey had any idea of the battlefield or of the capabilities of the enemy and Blamey showed his ignorance during the visit which didn’t endear him to the troops as he publicly belittled their efforts. They had no situational awareness whatever of the battlefield and the Australians paid for this in blood.

Of course General Rowell’s departure made no difference as the situation in Guadalcanal was demanding more Japanese resources and Port Moresby would not be captured without them. Japanese reinforcements were not forthcoming and on 18 September the Japanese high command ordered a withdrawal.

But the Japanese were not defeated and the Australian counter attack was no easy task despite further AIF reinforcements. The Australians recaptured Kokoda on 2 November 1942, but General MacArthur was still dissatisfied so Blamey sacked General Allen the tactical commander.

As you know, resupply was a nightmare. During the withdrawal, the Australian lines of communication were shortening, although resupply and casualty evacuation were mainly by native carriers, 3000 of them. The Japanese situation was the direct opposite as their lines were progressively lengthening until they became a huge factor in their stalled offensive.

On the way back north the Australians suffered as their lines lengthened, although airdrops from Port Moresby helped immensely, even though many went astray. Most were by free drops into clearings on the ridges. But the problem eased once the Australians recaptured Kokoda on 2 November.

Throughout this campaign, logistics played a huge role in the success and there are many unsung heroes, both military and civilian, whose trojan efforts kept the front line troops supplied and the casualties evacuated.

We don’t hear much about the battles to clear the Japanese from the north coast, but they were tough and bloody. The Japanese defences at Buna and Sanananda were manned by 9,000 troops who were well positioned in an area which was swampy and very tough for the attackers, limiting them to frontal attacks. General MacArthur sacked an American Divisional Commander whose division, which had been sent to help, didn’t perform to his satisfaction and Blamey put unreasonable pressure on the Australians costing many lives. Once again neither had any situational awareness.

The Japanese resistance finally petered out in January 1943. They had committed 20,000 troops and 13,000 were killed.

There were more than 2000 Australian killed and 3500 wounded, and there were large numbers from both sides who became casualties due to tropical diseases mainly malaria. Pneumonia was also a serious problem as it rained nearly every afternoon and it was very cold on the ridges. It was warmer in the gullies but they were full of mosquitoes. Dysentery was also prevalent as the troops weakened.

While I haven’t said anything about the other two battles which took place during August 1942 in the middle of the Kokoda campaign, they were significant. They were Milne Bay where the Japanese were denied the airfields and defeated on land for the first time, and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, which was MacArthur’s pet project on his way back to the Philippines.

All these battles were quite magnificent and laid the platform for the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific. The pity of it is that the nature of the land battle was never understood by the high command which was more of a hindrance than a help. I have always believed that the battles of Kokoda, Gona, Buna, Sanananda and Milne Bay deserve more recognition and I honour all those who fought there.

Thank you